ColombianLenin [he/him]

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Joined 7 months ago
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Cake day: January 29th, 2025

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  • Colombian president Gustavo Petro on Twitter:

    I publicly transmit my order, as commander of the armed forces of Colombia. Colombia and Venezuela are the same people, the same flag, the same history.

    Any military operation that lacks the approval of our brother nations is an aggression against Latin America and the Caribbean. It is a fundamental contradiction to our principle of Liberty. Liberty or death—Bolívar’s cry—and the people rose up.

    Considering Trump’s threats about using military force on Venezuela and Mexico, my understanding is that Petro is threatening to use the Colombian army as support for Venezuela’s army in the event of military action from the US. How much support or how politically feasible this can be, I’m not sure, but I don’t think he can do that much to support Venezuela in the event of US military action due to internal politics.

    Still, I think it’s a positive, if bold, move, and also I don’t really think Venezuela needs much support in the event of military action. The Venezuelan people would absolutely rally around the flag in that event, since Venezuela’s rhetoric has been consistently about US anti-imperialism, in a similar fashion to what you would hear from the DPRK.







  • Two tweets from Elijah Magnier:

    1. Relax!

    There is no civil war in Lebanon, and nothing will happen. No worry! The government’s decision is folkloric and will please the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia, but can’t be translated on the ground. No army in the Middle East can present a viable military plan to disarm Hezbollah.

    How does the Lebanese army implement this decision against 100,000 Hezbollah-trained ground force members and a total of half a million Shia men ready to fight for their existence?

    Source

    1. When Israel demands Hezbollah’s disarmament—channelled through Saudi Arabia and the US —as a condition for withdrawing from occupied Lebanese territories, it reveals a critical paradox:

    Israel is effectively acknowledging that only Hezbollah’s military capability constitutes sufficient pressure to compel its withdrawal. In other words, it is Hezbollah—not the Lebanese government or army—that Israel sees as the real negotiating counterweight.

    This, in turn, underscores a deeper truth:

    The Lebanese state currently lacks the leverage—diplomatic, military, or strategic—to assert its sovereignty over its own territory without Hezbollah’s deterrent force. The call to disarm Hezbollah, framed as a prerequisite for Israeli withdrawal, is therefore both logically flawed and politically revealing. It asks the country to forfeit its only means of leverage before securing its rights—effectively demanding submission, not resolution.

    Regardless,Hezbollah won’t deliver its weapons.

    Source